Two players are endowed with resources for setting up N locations on K identical circles, with N > K ≥ 1. The players alternately choose these locations (possibly in batches of more than one in each round) in order to secure the area closer to their locations than that of their rival's. They face a resource mobility constraint such that not all N locations can be placed in the first round. The player with the highest secured area wins the game and otherwise the game ends in a tie. Earlier research has shown that for K = 1, the second mover always has a winning strategy in this game. In this paper we show that with K > 1, the second mover advantage disappears as in this case both players have a tying strategy. We also study a natural variant of this game where the resource mobility constraint is more stringent so that in each round each player chooses a single location where we show that the second mover advantage re-appears. We suggest some Nash equilibrium configurations of locations in both versions of the game.
Introduction
The possibility and practice of choosing locations competitively in order to maximize influence over sources that generate payoffs is widespread in economics and politics. For example, retail firms compete over geographic location of chain stores in order to capture a larger share of the market.
Political parties may set up party-offices or affiliated bodies in order to spread political influence over the electorate. In such situations, the ability of players to maximize influence by choosing locations may depend upon the order in which such locations are chosen, thereby bringing up issues concerning the first and second mover advantages.
Games involving choice of locations has long been an important area of study in economics. The corresponding literature centers around the seminal work by Hotelling [1929] which considers a profit maximizing firm's decision about optimal location when the consumers are located uniformly on a line segment. Subsequently, this was extended to the celebrated circular city model in Chamberlin [1953] and later by Salop [1979] . While in Hotelling [1929] , Chamberlin [1953] and Salop [1979] simultaneous-move games are considered, Prescott and Visscher [1977] and Economides [1986] study the problem when firms are allowed to enter sequentially on a line segment and circular city respectively to show that the outcomes of a sequential location game can differ significantly from those obtained in a simultaneous-move scenario.
In some environments involving location games, players may have the sole objective of being the one with the highest influence, as for example, in a competition to win the race for establishing its product as the standard product in the market, a firm may set shops to acquire patronage from a majority of customers (like popularizing a software) which may then have long term benefits for the firm. In politics, having the highest ideological 1 influence is a natural objective under plurality rules and political parties locate their representatives in order to spread this influence. It is of particular interest in situations where voters have but a small cost of voting in which case it is hard to justify voter participation and several papers try to explain large voter turnouts by assuming that parties are able to influence individual voters to join ideological groups. As put in Martinelli and Herrera [2006] , voters are to belong to groups and groups are formed by leading party activists (see also for example Shachar and Nalebuff [1999] and Coate and Conlin [2004] ). While Martinelli and Herrera [2006] extend the existing literature on how parties influence voters by forming groups through group leaders to the case where these leader arrive endogenously from the population, the game we study can be applied to situations where two existing parties locate respective party leaders across the electorate to do the same.
With such objectives, it is important to find specifically a winning or tying strategy for a player.
A recent work in this respect is a game of influence studied by Ahn et al. [2004] , where there are two players (firms or political parties) who are each endowed with the same number of facilities (resources to set up a number of shops or finance a number of party leaders) to locate (possibly in batches of more than one facilities) on a circle in a sequential manner. In order to win the game, a player must try to secure as much area as possible that is closer to its locations than those of its competitor. Each player faces a resource mobility constraint such that not all facilities can be located in the first round. They show that in such a game (to be described precisely in section 2) where play must involve at least two rounds, the second mover always has a winning strategy and the game would always result in a tie if players were forced to end the game in a single round. In Cheong et al.
[2002] the existence of a winning strategy for the second mover is shown, even for a single round location game played on a two dimensional closed plane. In Chawla et al. [2003] an upper bound for the size of the first mover disadvantage is provided in a game where firms compete to maximize market shares and consumers are distributed over a d-dimensional Euclidean space.
A variant of the the above mentioned games of influence is where players compete over a collection of disjoint areas in which locations can be placed.
To the best of our knowledge, this variant has not been studied so far and there are many real life situations that suggest its importance. For example, retail chains set up stores in different cities or countries. In politics, these disjoint areas can represent different sections of the citizens with distinct group-identities (like workers, students, or simply electorally disconnected geographic neighbourhoods like districts and states) and to set up locations in a given region can be viewed as an attempt by the political parties to open political units (like politically motivated trade unions, district party offices or students unions in academic institutions wth designated leaders) to spread influence among target groups and increase favorable voter participation.
This paper adresses such location games on disjoint areas by extending Ahn et al. [2004] to a family of disjoint circles. In what follows we shall abstract away from parties and firms and simply refer to them as players. We are not interested in studying any particular model in politics or industry, but rather analyze the issue of stratgic influence in abstract. It is also important to mention that all our results can be easily extended to any closed curves rather than just circles.
We show that the second mover advantage as in Ahn et al. [2004] disappears and the first mover always has a tying strategy. We also show that in any Nash equilibrim of the game, there must be a tie. We then extend this game by making the resource mobility constraint more stringent so that in each round, each player places exactly one location. In this extended game we show that the second mover advantage as in Ahn et al. [2004] reappears.
We also provide some characterizations of final equilibrium configurations.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we define the game. Section 3 states and proves our results. Examples of final equilibrium configurations are depicted in section 4 and the paper concludes in section 5.
The Multiple Circle game
The circle game studied in Ahn et al. [2004] has two players, called 1 Red (R) and Green (G) each having N points to place (or locations to choose) alternately on a circle with R making the first move. Moreover, (i) each player must place at least one point in each round, (ii) in the first round when play begins, R cannot place all N points (perhaps because not all resources are available at the beginning of the game), 2 (iii) the game ends only after all players have placed all 2N points, (iv) at any round, the total points placed so far by G cannot exceed that of R 3 , and (v) a location on the circle cannot serve more than one points. This results in a sequential game where roles (that is first and second mover identities) cannot be reversed and the number of rounds is endogenous and can be controlled by R subject to the restriction that there must be at least 2 rounds. The objective of each player, as in Voronoi games (a term coined by Ahn et al. [2004] ), is to maximize the total length of the curve that is closer to that player than to 1 originally called White and Black in Ahn et al. [2004] 2 requirements (i) and (ii) imply that N ≥ 2. 3 This is basically a condition required to preserve the first and second mover identities over any play. These identites could be preserved even with the assumption that players place equal number of points in each period. In this sense, the condition given in Ahn et al. [2004] and used here is general and hence weaker. In Subsection 3.1 we shall study a natural variant of this game where each player must place exactly one point in each round.
the other so that a player wins if and only if the area it secures is strictly the largest one. Otherwise there is a tie. It is shown in Ahn et al. [2004] that in this game G always has a winning strategy, though R can bring its length of influence as close as that of G's. Our objective is to check if such a second mover advantage prevails when there are more that one disjoint identical circles. We now present these ideas and the finding in Ahn et al. [2004] formally.
Let {R, G} be a set of players, where R stands for Red and G stands for Green. The game on the family of disjoint circles is defined by a pair
is a family of K disjoint circles. Notice that the game studied in Ahn et al. [2004] is the special case where K = 1. Throughout the game each player p ∈ {R, G} will select a total of N points on K circles. The set of points selected by R is Γ ⊆ K j=1 C j and the set of points selected by G is Ω ⊆ K j=1 C j . Players re-arrive in alternating sequence with R moving first, and are in principle allowed to place points in batches. Let Γ r be the set of points that R places in round r ≥ 1 while Ω r be the same for G. The game ends when all 2N points are placed on the circles. 4 We will use w ∈ Γ (b ∈ Ω) to denote a point placed by R (G) during the game. We will call points placed by the player R red points and those placed by the player G green points.
As discussed above, the game has the following conditions:
4 Please note that we put no restriction on how players distribute these points across the circles (some circles are allowed to remain empty in which case it is ignored while computing payoffs).
4.
The endogenously determined number of rounds in a given play of the game will be denoted by Z. Obviously Γ = Z r=1 Γ r and Ω = Z r=1 Ω r . Notice that the restrictions of the game imply that Z ≥ 2.
Let C be any circle and let (x, y) be an ordered pair of elements of C.
We will use (x, y) to denote the arc of the circle between x and y in clockwise direction. Let a(x, y) ∈ [0, 1] denote an angle in clockwise direction between halflines starting from the center of the circle and going through x and y (we normalize an angle, so that a full circle has angle equal to 1). Then d(x, y) = min{a(x, y), a(y, x)} is the angular distance between x and y.
Given an arc (x, y), the length (or a volume) of (x, y) is a(x, y).
Given a circle C k , let
be a set of points of C k that are closer to points placed by R on C k than to points placed there by G. Let A G (C k ) be the analogical set defined for G. Notice that each of these sets is a finite set of arcs of a circle C k . Let A be a finite set of arcs and let V (A) denote the volume (sum of lengths, in angular terms) of arcs in A. When the game ends, each player p receives a score S p equal to the volume of the set of arcs constituting the set of points closest to a position chosen by that player over all circles, that is
for p ∈ {R, G}. Given these scores, the payoff of the players is u p (S p , S q ) = S p − S q , where {p, q} = {R, G}. We say that the game is a tie if S p = S q , while player p wins if S p > S q . A strategy in general will be a contingent plan for every possible history of the game. We do not need to define this general notion formally although we lay out complete specifications of the strategies we report. We will use uppercase letters S, T , X, Y to denote pure strategies. Strategy X is called a winning strategy (a tying strategy) for player p if no matter what player q does, by using X player p guarantees that S p > S q (S p ≥ S q ). Throughout the paper we will use the standard notation m | n, to denote the fact that m divides n and m n, to denote its negation.
Some definitions and existing results
We first develop some concepts and notations. Let C be a circle and let P ⊆ C be a finite set of points on the circle. Then an arc (x, y) ⊆ C such that {x, y} ⊆ P and (x, y) ∩ P = ∅ is called an interval. Now let P R and P G such that P R ∪ P G = P be sets of red and green points of P , respectively. Then an arc (x, y) ⊆ C such that {x, y} ⊆ P R ({x, y} ⊆ P G ) and and (x, y)
An interval that is neither red nor green is called a bichromatic interval
and an interval which is not bichromatic shall be at times referred to as a monochromatic interval in general. We will use r C (g C ) to denote the number of red (green) points placed on the circle C. We will also use I R (C) (I G (C)) to denote the number of red (green) intervals on the circle C.
Given a circle C and a point x ∈ C, an antipode of x is the point y ∈ C such that d(x, y) = 1/2. The pair of points {x, y} is called a pair of antipodes of C. Let m be a positive natural number. Then the set of key positions 5 on C determined by point x and m is the set κ(C, x, m) = {p ∈ C : a(p, x) = l/m, where l ∈ {0, . . . , m − 1}}.
By the set of key positions determined by m we mean a set of key positions 5 We use a term key position here for what was called a key point in the paper Ahn et al. [2004] . We found the name key position somewhat more apropriate in our context. if there is more than one interval of the opponent then place a point in the middle of a maximal interval of the opponent else if there is exactly one interval of the opponent and its length is l then place a point in a bichromatic key interval at distance less than 1/N − l from endpoint of the opponent Theorem 1 (Ahn et al. [2004] ) Let N, {C j } K j=1 define a game on a single circle such that K = 1. Then S * is a winning strategy for G although R can always bring the difference S G − S R as close as possible to zero.
3 Results
We first show that for any game N, {C j } K j=1 with K ≥ 2 and N ≥ K, R, i.e. the first mover, has a tying strategy. We will consider two cases separately: K N and K | N . We start by demonstrating a tying strategy for R for the first case. The general idea of this strategy is for R to capture key positions on the circles. Key positions on each circle will be determined by the first point placed on the circle and either N/K or N/K , depending on the situation (and G's play, in particular). Let r be a round and let L(r) be the number of circles occupied after R places the first of the points he is to place in round r. Key positions on the occupied circles are determined with respect to N/K and the first point placed on the circle. The number of total key positions on these circles is L(r) N/K and the number of vacant key positions is
where Y (r) is the number of key position already occupied after R places the first point in round r. Let ϕ(r) stand for the number of points R is left with if after placing his first point in round r he would have covered all vacant key positions in the occupied circles, that is
We first prove the following lemmas and a corollary, which are generalizations of the lemmas presented in Ahn et al. [2004] for more than one circle.
Lemma 1 Let {C k } K k=1 be a family of circles. Then
Strategy T * if r = 1 then place one point in some circle else if r ≥ 2 then 
then divide the free circles equally by taking key positions on them with all remaining points i.e. the difference between the number if red points and green points placed on the family of circles is equal to the difference between the number of red and green intervals on that family of circles.
Proof. In Ahn et al. [2004] it is shown that for any circle C it holds that
The following corollary is immediate from the above lemma.
be a family of circles where each of the players R and G placed the same number of points. Then the number of red and green intervals is the same.
Lemma 2 Let {C k } K k=1 be a family of circles with key positions with respect to some M for each circle. Assume that (i) there are r = K k=1 r C k ≤ KM red and g = K k=1 g C k < r green points on the family of circles covering all KM key positions and (ii) there is only one red interval which is not a key interval. Then there exists a bichromatic key interval.
Proof. The argument used in Ahn et al. [2004] for an analogical lemma for one circle works for this lemma as well. We have r + g ≤ 2KM − 1 points on the circles and KM of them are key points. Thus there are at most KM − 1 points lying within some key intervals. This leaves one key interval without a point. This key interval cannot be red, as there is only one red interval which is not a key interval. The key interval cannot be green, as by Lemma 1, this would mean that there are more then one red intervals (notice that r > g). Thus the key interval must be bichromatic.
We now prove our first main result by identifying a tying strategy called T * for R, the first mover.
Theorem 2 Let N, {C j } K j=1 define a game on the family of disjoint circles with K ≥ 2. If K N , then T * is a tying strategy for R.
Proof. We start by showing that strategy T * is implementable. The only situation, where the strategy may not be applied is the one where at some round r, R faces the situation where there is no key position left (and he is having e > 0 points left). This means that in each of the K circles, N/K key positions are taken (notice that if G does not take any key position up to the round r, then this situation cannot appear). Let r ≤ r be the last round such that at the round r − 1, G took a key position.
Observe that it must be that r = r, as R is able to cover all remaining key positions at r. Consider R's move at the round r − 1. Since R has enough points to cover all remaining key positions at this stage, he would do that and this contradicts the assumption that G places a point in a key position at this round. Thus the strategy is implementable. Now we will show that using this strategy either R wins or ties. Secondly, observe that if G and R covered all key positions in L circles (k key positions on each of the circles) using the same number of points, and so that R's points are placed on key positions only then G cannot be winning on these circles. This is because if G is to be winning then there must be some green intervals on the circles (for if there are not then there is a tie, as each bichromatic interval is divided equally between G and R).
According to the fact 1, there must be the same amount of red intervals.
Since each red interval is of size 1/k and each green interval is of size ≤ 1/k, so G cannot be winning.
Assume that in the last round R played according to (d). Then before R's move some 1 ≤ L < K circles were covered by G and R so that the 7 By "gain" we mean the area acquired by the player plus the area lost by the opponent.
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Now assume that in the last round R did not play according to (d) .
Then at the end of the game we will have the situation where all circles are covered with the same amount of green and red points, all key positions are taken ( N/K key positions on each circle) and R placed his points on key positions only. Then there is a tie.
Our next result deals with the case where K | N where we show that R has a tying strategy in this case as well. The strategy is simple and is therefore defined directly in the proof of the theorem. We shall refer to it as T * as well since its identity will be clear from whether K | N or not.
Theorem 3 Let N, {C j } K j=1 define a game on the family of disjoint circles with K ≥ 2. If K | N , then R has a tying strategy (which will be also called
Proof. Observe that R can implement K/N red arcs of equal size on each of the K circles by placing N points. To see this, consider the following strategy of R (called T * ): place exactly N/K equidistant points in round r on circle C r . Obviously since C r is continuous, G can always do that.
Thus at the end of the game both R and G placed the same amount N of points in K circles. Moreover R points take N/K key positions determined by a red point and N/K in each of these circles. If there is no green interval on the circles then there is a tie. Observe that if there is a green interval, then its size is always ≤ K/N while each red interval has size K/N . Thus if there are any green intervals, then by the fact 1 it cannot be that G won.
By Theroem 2 and Theroem 3 we have shown that if K ≥ 2, then R, the first mover, has a tying strategy in the game and hence the second mover advantage present under K = 1 disappears. The question that arises now is: can the first mover do better? The answer is no as we show the existence of a tying strategy for the second mover as well, as stated in the theorem below. This strategy, which we call T , is simple and is as follows:
Strategy T place exactly one point in each red interval created by R in any given round Theorem 4 Let N, {C j } K j=1 define a game on a family of K disjoint circles. Then T is a tying strategy for G.
Proof. Strategy T requires G to place exactly one point in each red interval created in a given round. It is easy to see that this will ensure that at the end of the game there is no monochromatic intervals, which is then a tie. So what requires to be proved is that this strategy is implementable which we do by induction on the number of the current round. We will show two things: after R plays in round r, G can place exactly one point in a red interval and there is no monochromatic interval after G's move.
Consider the first round. There are no intervals before players move. Assume that R placed m points. Then, by Lemma 1 there are m red intervals created and G can place m points, one within each interval. Thus there is no monochromatic interval after the first round. Now consider a round r > 1. By induction, there is no monochromatic interval before R's move and, by similar argument as in the case of the first round, there is exactly the same number of newly created red intervals as the number of red points placed. Thus G can place exactly one point in each of the newly created red intervals and there are no monochromatic intervals after the round r. This shows that G's tying strategy is implementable.
The following theorem is an immediate consequence of the results we have proved so far. j=1 define a game on the family of K disjoint circles. Then strategy profile (T * , T ), where player R plays T * while player G plays T , is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Moreover, in every final configuration resulting from this Nash equilibrium profile of strategies, (i) there is no monochromatic interval on any circle and (ii) all red points lie on key positions.
There may be other equilibrium points in this game. We shall use the above equilibrium in the examples we set in section 4 to study equilibrium configurations. We now deal with a variant of this game where the resource mobility constraint becomes most binding.
"One-by-one" variant of the game
A natural variant of the game studied above is the one where players face very strict resource mobilization constraints so that each places a single point in each round. Recall that in the tying strategy T * used by R, it was crucial for R to place more than one point at some rounds. It turns out that if players face such a strict resource mobility constraint as the one we are dealing with now, then G, the second mover has a winning strategy.
The strategy, which we shall call Y * , is a generalization of the winning strategy S * of the second mover in the one circle case presented in Theorem 1. Player G first tries to take key positions with respect to N/K or N/K (depending on the situation described precisely below) and the first point placed on that circle. Then he breaks biggest red intervals, by placing a point inside them. In his last move he either breaks the biggest red interval or plays in a bichromatic interval that is bigger than the biggest red interval. if there is more than one interval of the opponent then place a point in the middle of a maximal interval of the opponent else if there is exactly one interval of the opponent and its length is l then place a point in a bichromatic key interval at distance less than 1/ N/K − l from endpoint of the opponent Theorem 6 Let N, {C j } K j=1 define a game on the family of disjoint circles with N > K ≥ 2 and assume that players face a very strict resource mobility constraint so that they are allowed to place exactly one point at a time. Then Y * is a winning strategy for G.
Proof. Notice that, just as in the case of S * , the use of strategy Y * leads to the following three stages of the game for player G. First the option (a) is excercised, until all key positions are covered (some of them with respect to N/K and others with respect to N/K ). Then the option (b) is excercised, until G reaches a round where he has only one point left (since the game is restricted, so that both players play exactly one point at each round this will be at the round r = Z). Finally the last stage is reached, where G plays according to (c). We start with two claims.
Claim 1 After the end of round (a), G has at least one point left.
Proof. Observe first that key positions are taken either with respect to Since R places at least one point in a key position (which is the first point placed by him) and throughout the game G never assigns N/K as the number of key positions to more than N mod K circles that do not contain a red key point (by checking each time when the green point is placed on free circles as to whether the number of free circles
G will have at least one point left after all key positions are taken.
Claim 2 The number of red key intervals of size 1/ N/K is never greater than the number of green key intervals of that size.
Proof. This is because whenever R places a point in an empty circle, G 
Now assume that case (ii) holds. Consider the situation before R's move.
It must be that there is no red interval. Consider the group of circles for which N/K key positions are assigned. It cannot be that R has more points than G on these circles Analogically it can be shown that G wins when R creates a red interval on the group of circles for which N/K key positions are assigned. 11 This completes the proof.
Some footnotes used in the proof of the above theorem suggest that although G, the second mover can win the game, R may be able to make the difference between their scores arbitrarily small. In the following theorem we show that the winning strategy Y * for the second mover, with a slight modification and called Y , can be used by the first mover R to achieve this independent of the strategy used by G.
A strategy X is a virtually tying strategy for player p if X is not a winning strategy and for any ε > 0, if player p uses X, then no matter what player q does, player p can guarantee that S q − S p < ε.
Theorem 7 Let N, {C j } K j=1 define a game on the family of disjoint circles with N > K ≥ 2 and assume that players face a very strict resource mobility constraint so that they are allowed to place exactly one point at a time. Then there is a virtually tying strategy for G.
Proof. Consider strategy Y * as defined before with option (c) replaced by option (c') (this modified strategy will be called Y ).
Y : Modification of Y * for player R In the third stage, whenever player R creates a red interval he is gaining an advantage of the size of this interval. If G breaks the interval, the game is in a tie again. Otherwise in the next round (if there is a next round) R breaks the green interval, regaining his advantage. Now assume the game is in its last round. Assume the length of the bichromatic interval within which R created his last red interval is l. If G is to win, he must create a green interval within a bichromatic interval of the size > l − ε and the created interval cannot be bigger than the red one by more than a margin < ε (as a maximal remaining bichromatic interval has size ≤ l).
Nash equilibrium of the ε-adjusted game
Since G wins for sure in the one-by-one variant of the game, that points are be placed on continuous curves and no single point on a circle can be served by more than one loctions, R does not really have an optimal strategy. Hence, a Nash equilibrium in this version of the game does not exist.
However, strategy Y becomes a dominant strategy for player R if we restrict attention further to one-by-one games where R is not allowed to place his points within a distance smaller than 1/ N/K ε > 0 to a green point. This is because, as follows from proof of Theroem 7, just before the last round R is not loosing and in the last round G can create an interval of the size greater than the interval created by R, by at most ε. With this observation, the following theorem is immediate.
Theorem 8 Let N, {C j } K j=1 define a game on the family of disjoint circles with N > K ≥ 2 and assume that players face a very strict resource mobility constraint so that they are allowed to place exactly one point at a time.
Suppose also that R, the first mover, is not allowed to place his points within a distance smaller than 1/ N/K ε > 0 to a green point. Then strat-egy profile (Y , Y * ), where the first mover uses strategy Y while the second player uses strategy Y * is a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, in every final configuration resulting from this Nash equilibrium there exists a monochromatic interval.
We are obviously interested in the case where ε is arbitrarily close to zero. This theorem will be used to produce equilibrium final configurations in the one-by-one variant.
Examples
In this section we present examples illustrating the game when the players use the strategies presented above. We start with general game where R plays according to T * while G plays according to T . There are two cases here: K | N and K N . We illustrate only the second case, which is more involved. Final configurations in the first case are similar to those of the second case if both players play these tying strategies.
Let N = 11 and K = 3. Player R starts by placing a point in an empty circle (which defines key positions for this circle with respect to the red point and 11/3 = 4) and G answers by placing a point in an empty circle (taking a key position and defining remaining key positions for this circle with respect to 4). The configurations created during the game are presented in Fig. 1 . We use empty discs to depict red points and filled discs to depict green points. Key positions are depicted with short dashes intersecting the circles. In the rounds 2-4 player R plays according to option (b) taking free key positions in the first circle while G places his points within red intervals.
In the round 5 player R plays according to option ( The game goes on in this manner until the last round is reached. In the last round player R applies option (c') of his strategy Y again and player G responds by applying option (c) of his strategy Y * and creating a green interval slightly bigger than the one created by R in this turn. This ends the game and G wins by the margin ε, the difference between intervals created in the last round.
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Concluding remarks
We have studied an extension of the two-player Voronoi game of Ahn et al.
[2004] to a playing arena involving multiple disjoint closed curves. Such games can be used to model important real life situations as highlighted in the introduction. We have shown that the second mover advantage, albeit arbitrarily small as shown in Ahn et al. [2004] , disappears as we find tying strategies for both the first and the second mover, thereby enabling us to demonstrate Nash equilibrium configurations of locations. A general property of all such equilibrium configurations is that locations on each circle alternate in colour. We then study a natural variant of this game where players face very strict resource mobility constraints to show that the second mover advantage, again though arbitrarily small, re-appears. In the resulting equilibrium configurations of this version of the game, we show that there exists monochromatic intervals, an interesting difference vis-a-vis equilibrium configurations in the original game. One may think of the rules of the game as a mechanism by which distributions of influence between the two acting players can be affected and in that sense we have shown that a "literally fair" division is always Nash implementable. Ahn et al. [2004] has also studied such location games on line segments and it would be interesting to study our game on a family of disjoint line segments. Also, it would be important to generalize our games to those involving more than two players. Note also that the tying strategy of the first mover that we demonstrate depends crucially on the fact the the total number of points N is known. It would be interesting to extend these environments to incomplete information. 
